Omnibus II Effective Measures in Adjusting the Current Solvency II Framework  by Peleckienė, Valentina & Peleckis, Kęstutis
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  110 ( 2014 )  156 – 163 
1877-0428 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Contemporary Issues in Business, Management and Education conference.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.858 
ScienceDirect
Contemporary Issues in Business, Management and Education 2013 
Omnibus II effective measures in adjusting the current Solvency II 
framework  
Valentina Peleckienėa*, Kęstutis Peleckisa 
 
aVilnius Gediminas technical university, Saulėtekio al. 11, LT–10223 Vilnius, Lithuania 
Abstract 
The article describes some difficulties arising in connection with implementation of Solvency II at the Member State 
level. The main objective of this paper is to present the problem solving of Solvency II Directive of insurance and 
reinsurance on long-term guarantee package with the help of the new Omnibus II Directive. For this purpose in the 
article were investigated the results of last impact assessment with long-term guarantees package to the current 
Solvency II framework to cope with artificial volatility and low interest rate environment, and to ensure both 
transparency and level-playing field. After the impact assessment EIOPA analyzed each measure against the 
objectives and recommended the inclusion of the following measures: extrapolation, classical matching adjustment, 
transitional measures, and extension of the recovery period, not to include the so-called extended matching 
adjustment on the basis that it would not provide sufficient policyholder protection. 
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1. Introduction 
The Omnibus II Directive will amend certain provisions of the Solvency II Directive, including the 
implementation date. There has been limited progress in agreeing the details of the new legislation. According to the 
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Solvency II EU Directive implementation timetable, from 2014, following the entry into force of the Directive, 
insurance companies within the European Union with a gross premium income of more than 5 million euro will be 
required to establish their capital requirements in accordance with this Directive (Clipici, 2012).  Omnibus II will 
amend the Solvency II Framework Directive, to bring it in line with the EU’s Lisbon Treaty and to take account of 
the EU’s new supervisory structure. Adoption of Omnibus II requires agreement from the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. Discussions on the proposals have been 
significantly delayed by the failure to agree provisions of the long-term guarantee package. As a result, it was 
decided to conduct impact assessment to decide on the final provisions. 
The impact assessment took place between 28 January and 31 March 2013. The European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) released its findings in June 2013. 
2. The Solvency II implementation obstacles 
The Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) on the financial position of insurance undertakings  had to be adapted 
in response to: new architecture for its implementing measures introduced in the Lisbon Treaty (2009) new financial 
supervision measures introduced in Regulation 1094/2010 establishing the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority.    
In order for the ESFS to work effectively, changes to the financial services legislation would be necessary, in 
particular to provide an appropriate scope to the more general powers provided for in the individual regulations 
establishing the authorities, ensuring a more harmonized set of financial rules through the possibility to develop draft 
technical standards and facilitate the sharing, where necessary, of micro-prudential information. 
The Commission Communication on Financial Supervision in Europe was accompanied by an impact assessment 
analyzing the main policy options for establishing the ESFS and ESRB. A second impact assessment accompanied 
the legislative proposals, examining the options in more detail and analyzed the options for the appropriate powers 
for the authorities to work towards achieving a single set of harmonized rules and concluded that this capacity would 
be rightly limited to those areas to be defined in forthcoming sectorial legislation, and identified such potential areas. 
Additionally, in developing the draft technical standards themselves, the authorities should undertake appropriate 
analysis of potential related costs and benefits and consult stakeholders before submitting them to the Commission. 
These changes will be implemented through the “Omnibus II directive”, currently in negotiations between 
Parliament and Council. The Framework Directive is principles-based, and the detailed rules of the Solvency II 
regime will be contained in Implementing Measures adopted by the Commission, and covering about 40 important 
areas in the Framework Directive. The Commission will propose implementing measures after Omnibus II directive 
enters into force.  
The changes to be made to the Solvency II Directive aim to: 
• to adjust existing level 2 empowerments to the Lisbon Treaty: existing level 2 empowerments should be 
transformed into empowerments for delegated acts. Also appropriate control procedures should be foreseen; 
• provide for transitional requirements in relation to valuation, governance, supervisory reporting and public 
disclosure, the determination and classification of own funds, the standard formula for the calculation of the 
Solvency Capital Requirement and the choice of methods and assumptions for the calculation of technical 
provisions, including the determination of the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure. It is also necessary to 
enable level 2 measures to specify transitional arrangements in relation to the treatment of third country regimes. 
The transitional requirements should not result in more favorable treatment for insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings, or lower protection for policy holders. They should encourage undertakings to move towards 
compliance with the particular requirements of the new regime as soon as possible; 
• amend level 2 empowerments: in order to allow for greater convergence on procedures for supervisory approvals 
already provided for in Solvency II (specific parameters, model change policies, special purpose vehicles and the 
setting and removal of capital add-ons), the Commission should be empowered to adopt measures by means of 
delegated acts specifying procedure in these areas;  
• include the European Cooperative Society (SCE) in the list of permissible forms of insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings; 
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• introduce an amendment to reflect the adaptation to the Euro amount of the MCR floor for captive reinsurance 
undertakings.  
The first Quick Fix Directive stated that the application date for Solvency II is 1 January 2014. However, delays 
to the agreement on the final text of the Omnibus II Directive have made this date unworkable. The issue under 
discussion was a long term guarantee (LTG) package. It was decided that an impact assessment was necessary 
before legislation could be finalized. 
3. Long-term guarantee package and policyholder protection  
Experts agreed that Solvency II should include regulatory measures to deal with the issues associated with long-
term guarantees insurance products that may be affected by short term volatility (Bourdais, 2012). In this context, 
short-term volatility is volatility of technical provisions, capital resources (known as own funds) or capital 
requirements that does not reflect changes in the financial position or risk exposure of insurance or reinsurance 
undertakings carrying out insurance business of a long-term nature. The long-term guarantee package has been 
tested in the context of the Long-Term Guarantees Assessment and comprises different elements which are partially 
applicable for a short or medium term only. The following measures are part of the LTG package:  
Table 1. Long-term guarantee package measures. Source: Lloyd’s 
No. Measures Content of measure 
1. Applicable only in exceptional financial market 
circumstances / crises 
Counter-cyclical premium: national or currency-specific Pillar 1 adjustment to 
the risk-free rate applicable to all types of insurance business 
2. Applicable to certain long-term business for a 
transitional period: 
Extension of the recovery period: undertaking-specific Pillar 2 measure 
granting more time to recover from undercapitalization for undertakings with 
liabilities > 12 years; 
3. Transitional LTG measure Undertaking or portfolio-specific Pillar 1 adjustment to the risk-free rate for 
certain long-term guarantee products (restricted to 7 years) ; 
4. Permanently applicable to Extrapolation  Currency-specific Pillar 1 tool determining the risk-free term structure after the 
Last Liquid Point. 
5.  Extended „Matching Adjustment“  Portfolio-specific Pillar 1 adjustment to the risk-free rate for long-term 
contracts with matched assets and liabilities, and without policyholder options 
6. Classical” Matching Adjustment“ Portfolio-specific Pillar 1 adjustment to the risk-free rate for life contracts and 
non-life annuities 
 
The overall aim of the LTG package is to provide more stability to the economic balance sheet of insurers and 
thus to the European insurance market as a whole by ensuring that Solvency II includes appropriate regulatory 
measures to deal with issues associated with long-term guarantee products that may be especially affected by short-
term market movements. This is generally supporting policyholder protection. On the other hand, many participants 
raised the concern that any measure which increases the discount rate and therefore decreases technical provisions 
has the potential impact of reducing policyholder protection. For the most part, the tested LTG measures could result 
in an increase of the discount rate (apart from the extension of the recovery period), and so there is a clear potential 
risk to policyholder protection. The objectives of the technical impact assessment were to evaluate: 
• the impact of the proposed LTG package on policy holder protection; 
• whether the proposed LTG package will allow supervisory authorities to supervise insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings and insurance and reinsurance groups efficiently and effectively; 
• whether the proposed system can be implemented efficiently and effectively by all insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings and the cost of implementation; 
• whether the proposed system provides the right incentives for good risk management and wide risk 
diversification and contributes to the correct risk reflection of the undertakings; 
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• the impact on financial stability and whether the proposed system has the potential to create systemic risks; 
• the impact of the proposed LTG package on the single market, including on crossborder business; 
• the impact of the proposed LTG package on insurance and reinsurance undertakings' solvency position and also 
possible competition distortions in national markets and the single market;  
• the impact of the proposed LTG package on long-term investments by insurance and reinsurance undertakings. 
In order for the Long Term Guarantee measures to be effective in adjusting the current Solvency II framework to 
cope with artificial volatility and low interest rate environment, and to ensure both transparency and level-playing 
field, there are  proposed the following changes to the Long Term Guarantee Package: 1) Extrapolation, 2) Matching 
adjustment, 3) Volatility adjustment, 4) Extension of recovery period, 5) Transitional measure on the risk-free 
interest rates, 6) Transitional measure on technical provisions. 
3.1. Extrapolation 
The Solvency II Extrapolation has become a central element of the Long-Term Guarantees package. An economic 
extrapolation is a method of using known market values to estimate, or “extrapolate”, future values for which there 
is no accurate market data. In Solvency II it is used to smooth market volatility at the long-end of the interest rate 
curve by providing a more stable regulatory risk-free rate against which insurers’ long-term liabilities can be 
discounted (Fulcher, 2013).  
Essentially the Solvency II Extrapolation is comprised of three elements:  
1) the fixed interest rate to which long-dated forwards are assumed to converge (the Ultimate Forward Rate or 
UFR); 
2) the point from which market data is no longer used (the Last Liquid Point or LLP);  
3) and the rate of convergence from market rates at the LLP to the UFR.  
EIOPA advised to select a convergence period that is significantly longer than 10 years (e.g. 40 years) for the 
euro, as it should decrease more efficiently the volatility of own funds because it produces risk-free rates that are 
more market consistent, and gives also better incentives for good risk management. On the concerns whether the 
impact of extrapolation should not be publicly disclosed in the same way as for the matching adjustment, the 
volatility adjustment or the transitional measures, one can stress that the extrapolation is not a measure undertakings 
may choose but the prescribed method for derivation of discount rate when the risk-free interest rate can no longer 
be observed in financial markets. The extrapolation method used should be disclosed in the report on solvency and 
financial conditions together with the description of other methods used for the valuation of assets and liabilities, 
associated risk and sensitivities. 
During the crisis, markets experienced severe falls in prices of equity and credit assets accompanied by 
significant falls in long-dated yields. Insurers and pension funds in Europe, particularly in the Netherlands and 
Scandinavia were already subject to mark-to-market and risk-based capital rules, and as a result came under 
solvency pressure. They were forced to reduce risk and hedge rates to protect solvency, but this further depressed 
long-dated rates creating a pro-cyclical effect, as shown on Fig. 1.  
Fig.1 shows the difference between market forward rates at a 25 year and 15 year maturity for EUR and GBP. In 
the absence of supply-demand distortions, e.g. caused by regulatory-driven asset-liability hedging, one would expect 
this difference to be small and positive, and indeed this is the underlying assumption of Solvency II Extrapolation. 
Actual market rates show a different situation (Fulcher, 2013). Article 76 of the Solvency II Directive requires that 
technical provisions would be consistent with market prices and financial market data. Extrapolation was originally 
proposed only as a theoretical technique to place a market-consistent value on a non-traded item, namely ultra-long-
dated cash-flows past the term of any traded instruments, for example after 50 years in Euro (EUR). Following the 
global financial crisis, stakeholders started to question the reliability of market data and the potential impact of 
market-consistent valuation on macro-economic stability. Extrapolation was identified as a possible tool to manage 
pro-cyclicality. 
Criticism against Solvency II calibrations has been raised before, arguing, for example, that the Standard Formula 
is unstable with respect to distributional settings or the inappropriate choice of indices proxying specific equity 
classes (Mittnik, 2011). 
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Fig. 1. Distortions in EUR and GBP curves. Source:  Nomura 
3.2. Matching adjustment 
Strict ring-fencing is one of the fundamental conditions to use classic matching adjustment. Nevertheless, the 
ring-fencing requirement should be understood in an economic sense and should not hinder the use of the matching 
adjustment in Member States where there is no legal concept of a ring-fenced fund in national legislation.  
Ring-fencing requires that the undertaking organizes and manages the portfolio of assets and obligations 
separately from other parts of the business and therefore is not able to meet risks arising elsewhere in the business 
using ring-fenced assets. This should not hinder an efficient portfolio management as recommended by EIOPA. 
However the reduced transferability and scope for diversification between the ring-fenced portfolio and the 
remainder of the undertaking needs to be reflected in calculation of own funds and the Solvency Capital 
Requirement. 
As there is no objective reason for the different floor to the fundamental spread, the exposures in corporate debt 
should be treated equally to exposures in sovereign debt. It would not favor investments in sovereign debt but should 
encourage long term investments in corporate bonds and thereby promote economic growth (Eling,  Pankoke, 2013). 
Where no reliable credit spread can be derived from default statistics, as it might be for government bonds, the 
fundamental spread should be equal to the floor of the fundamental spread, calculated as a portion of the long term 
average of the spread over the risk-free interest rate of assets of the same duration, credit quality and asset class, as 
observed in financial markets. 
For exposures to sovereign debt, the 'asset class' should capture the differences between individual Member 
States, as tested in the LTGA. 
It should be noted that there are other elements of the matching adjustment framework that should enable to 
ensure its prudence and transparency. The matching adjustment may be applied subject to prior approval by the 
supervisory authority. Undertakings applying the matching adjustment should regularly perform sensitivity analysis 
to the assumptions underlying the calculation of the matching adjustment and assess compliance with the eligibility 
criteria for application of the matching adjustment on a continuous basis through Own Risk and Solvency 
Assessment.  
In addition, the matching adjustment will be accompanied by the public disclosure of the application of this 
measure together with the full impact on the undertakings' financial position, in the same way as other Long Term 
Guarantee measures, in order to ensure transparency, comparability and a level-playing field. Public disclosure of 
the impact of the measure on the undertaking’s financial position should not lead to wrong conclusions nor create 
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confusion amongst the public. If undertaking explains that through sound risk management the matching adjustment 
enables to offer to policyholders more attractive insurance products, thus increasing the value of the undertaking, 
ensuring the future sustainability of the business and consumer protection, stakeholders will reward such behavior, 
particularly in the current low interest rate environment. Table 2 shows that under the current regime, insurers across 
Europe have typically regarded particular assets as a good match for long-term liabilities. In practice, this has meant 
holding corporate bonds in the UK and Spain, while French and Portuguese insurers prefer equities. Italian insurers 
have favored domestic government bonds.  
Table 2. Countercyclical measures & LT package by region. Source: Nomura 
                            Long-term liabilities  
Country  
Corporate bonds Equities Domestic government 
bonds 
United Kingdom x   
Spain x   
French  
 
 x  
Portuguese  x  
Italy   X 
3.3. Volatility adjustment 
The spread on the reference portfolio for the volatility adjustment should be determined in a transparent manner 
using relevant indices where available.  As the volatility adjustment would be a predictable adjustment, calculated on 
a permanent basis, the determination of the spread on the reference portfolio should be simple and based on indices 
where available. 
The volatility adjustment is designed to mitigate the effect of exaggerations of bond on undertaking’s own funds. 
It allows the inclusion in the discount rate of a portion of the spread observed on a representative portfolio of 
sovereign and corporate bonds held by European insurers. This portion of spread should not be attributable to a 
realistic assessment of expected losses, unexpected credit risk or any other risk of the assets, and it should reflect 
only “artificial volatility”. In addition, the use of the portfolio of assets held by the market at EU or level, instead of 
the actual portfolio of assets held by each undertaking, should prevent undertakings’ incentives to invest in riskier 
assets. 
The volatility adjustment would apply to all types of insurance obligations, life and non-life, without any 
eligibility conditions (except unit-linked liabilities) however the effect of application on major part of non-life 
insurance obligations would be limited because of the short duration of non-life insurance contracts. 
The volatility adjustment was proposed to substitute the counter-cyclical, which raised financial stability issues in 
relation to its activation/deactivation and the benefit of which was partially offset by additional capital requirements. 
The volatility adjustment should not have these drawbacks. 
The volatility adjustment would be a predictable adjustment, reflecting the situation of financial markets on a 
permanent basis, thus it would not be a permanently positive addition to the discount rate but would be close to zero 
under normal circumstances and could even turn, when markets are excessively optimistic (when the observed 
spread is lower than the fundamental spread), thus giving some symmetry to the measure. 
3.4. Extension of recovery period 
The conditions for the application of the extension of the recovery period needs to be  clarified in order to make 
sure  that this measure is applicable when exceptional adverse situations affect insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings representing a significant share of the market or affected lines of business. 
There are also further changes made to the first Presidency compromise text, in order to clarify the roles of both 
6national supervisory authority and EIOPA for the declaration of exceptional circumstances and when those 
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circumstances cease to apply, as well as for assessing if the conditions for applying the measure still persist. This 
should ensure a harmonized application of this measure. 
Concerns have been expressed that the 7 years length of the extension of recovery period is very long, but it 
should be noted that the Directive prescribes the maximum length of the extension and it is expected that national 
supervisory authority will not make use of that maximum extension in many cases.  
3.5. Transitional measure on the risk-free interest rates 
Where Member States have adopted laws, regulations and administrative provisions pursuant to Article 20 of 
Directive 2002/83/EC, the Solvency I interest rates for the calculation of transitional interest rates should be 
determined using the methods used by the insurance or reinsurance undertaking at the last date of the application of 
Directive 2002/83/EC. This should allow Member States that have a variable rate under Solvency I to apply the 
method rather than simply the rate applicable at the transposition date. 
There are other features of this measure that should ensure right incentives. The transitional measure on the risk-
free interest rates may be applied subject to prior approval by the supervisory authority. As well as for other Long 
Term Guarantee measures, the application of the transitional measure on the risk-free interest rates should be 
publicly disclosed together with the calculated transitional interest rate and the impact of this on undertaking’s 
financial position. In addition, undertakings should regularly assess whether they would comply with the Solvency 
Capital Requirement without application of the transitional interest rate and, if not, inform supervisory authority 
about actions taken and progress made to restore the compliance with the Solvency Capital Requirement at the end 
of the transitional period. 
3.6. Transitional measures on technical provisions 
The Solvency I technical provisions effectively being calculated in Member States should be used for the 
calculation of the transitional adjustment for technical provisions  
The transitional measure on technical provisions is calculated as a difference between the values of technical 
provisions under Solvency I and Solvency II, then gradually amortizing this amount to zero over the transitional 
period. Technical provisions should be calculated net of reinsurance, in order to evaluate reinsurance assets as well, 
following a total balance sheet approach. 
This measure may be used not only in markets where the difference in technical provisions is due to different 
discount rates, but in markets where the difference in technical provisions stems from other features than the 
discount rate (e.g. because of the risk margin or different contract boundaries). This broader transitional measure 
would be applicable to all obligations, life and non-life. 
For the same reasons as in the case of the transitional measure on the risk-free interest rates (having Solvency II 
balance sheet adjusted to show allowance for transition) was proposed that this transitional measure should impact 
the technical provisions and the Solvency Capital Requirement rather than being only an adjustment to own funds. 
The length of the period of the transitional measure on technical provisions still needs to be discussed. 
It should be noted that the additional requirements for supervisory approval, public disclosure and solvency 
without application of transitional measure should enable to ensure adequate prudence, transparency and give the 
right incentives for the application of this measure. 
4. Conclusions 
After the impact assessment EIOPA analyzed each measure and recommended the inclusion of the following 
measures: 
• Extrapolation – important for valuing insurance liabilities in the absence of reliable market information; 
• Classic Matching Adjustment – important for insurance products, such as annuities, which have predictable 
payments to policyholders and allow for strict cash flow matching; 
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• Transitional Measures – important for insurance products offering high interest guarantees that were 
concluded in the past, in order to smooth the transition from Solvency I to Solvency II; and 
• Extension of the Recovery Period – allows undertakings sufficient time to restore compliance with capital 
requirements in exceptional situations. 
EIOPA advises not to include the so-called Extended Matching Adjustment on the basis that it would not provide 
sufficient policyholder protection and would be unduly difficult to supervise. In addition, the Counter-Cyclical 
Premium (CCP) was judged to be likely to have an adverse financial stability impact due to the way it would be 
triggered, as well as unintended impacts on undertakings’ solvency requirements that it generated. As a 
consequence, EIOPA advises to replace the CCP with a permanent, more predictable measure, the Volatility 
Balancer, which like the CCP mitigates the impact of bond spread volatility on own funds but avoids side-effects on 
capital requirements. 
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